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This paper  develops  a methodological  framework  to  help  evaluate  the  performance  of
generic  pharmaceutical  policies  post-patent  expiry  or after  loss  of  exclusivity  in non-
tendering  settings,  comprising  ﬁve  indicators  (generic  availability,  time  delay  to and  speed
of  generic  entry,  number  of  generic  competitors,  price  developments,  and  generic  volume
share evolution)  and  proposes  a  series  of metrics  to  evaluate  performance.  The  paper sub-
sequently  tests  this  framework  across  twelve  EU  Member  States  (MS)  by using  IMS  data  on
101  patent  expired  molecules  over  the  1998–2010  period.  Results  indicate  that  signiﬁcant
variation  exists  in generic  market  entry,  price  competition  and  generic  penetration  across
the study  countries.  Size  of  a  geographical  market  is  not  a predictor  of generic  market  entry
intensity  or price  decline.  Regardless  of  geographic  or product  market  size,  many  off  patent
molecules lack  generic  competitors  two  years  after loss  of  exclusivity.  The  ranges  in  each
of  the ﬁve  proposed  indicators  suggest,  ﬁrst,  that  there  are  numerous  factors  – including
institutional  ones  – contributing  to  the  success  of  generic  entry,  price  decline  and  marketost savings penetration  and,  second,  MS  should  seek  a combination  of  supply  and  demand-side  policies
in order  to maximise  cost-savings  from  generics.  Overall,  there  seems  to be considerable
potential  for faster  generic  entry,  uptake  and  greater  generic  competition,  particularly  for
molecules at the  lower  end of  the  market.
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. IntroductionOver the past few decades spending on prescription
harmaceuticals has increased faster than total health
pending and gross domestic product in most OECD
ountries [1,2]. As a result of the observed and projected
rowth in pharmaceutical expenditures there is a need for
ncreased scrutiny and reform of pharmaceutical markets
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and regulatory practices [3]. Generic medicines can play
an important role in curbing rising pharmaceutical costs
and their cost-saving potential is signiﬁcant as they provide
both a lower-priced option for prescribers and patients and
a tool to drive-down prices of originator drugs [4]. The
extent to which generic drugs contribute to pharmaceutical
cost containment depends, in part, on the price compe-
tition incited through generic entry and diffusion. While
the potential of generic medicines as an expenditure-
optimisation tool is widely recognised, studies examining
how competition from generic entry affects originator
prices and market share have often drawn opposing con-
clusions [5–8,16], whereby in some instances originator
prices decline, whereas in others they increase.
e under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/
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A key policy imperative among OECD countries has
been the maximisation of potential savings through the
wider use of generics, after patent expiry or the loss of
market exclusivity of the originator. Yet, irrespective of
price levels for originator brands at patent expiry and
their spread across countries, signiﬁcant variation in the
prices of generics has been observed in a number of studies
[4,9]; in these, the price spread is signiﬁcantly more appar-
ent in generic medicines than it is in branded originators
both at and after patent expiry [9]. Considering this vari-
ation in prices post-patent expiry and the market shares
that generics command a debate exists as to what policy
mix  is most appropriate in fulﬁlling this dual objective of
achieving low prices and high market shares for generic
medicines and how this can be measured objectively. Per-
tinent questions in this context are, among others, the kind
of supply-side regulation, also on generic medicines, that
delivers higher price reductions post-patent expiry; the
demand-side policy mix  that delivers greater market share
for low-cost generics; and whether low prices for origina-
tors pre-patent expiry inﬂuence entry prices for generics
post-patent expiry and determine their path over time.
Signiﬁcant developments have taken place in most
OECD settings in terms of policies favouring the uptake and
use of generic medicines, including regulatory interven-
tions on prescribing and dispensing. Yet, an assessment of
how effective these measures and interventions are in pro-
moting wider generic use at a faster pace and at reduced
cost to health insurers is an issue that merits evaluation and
systematic appraisal. In this paper we address this gap in
three ways. First, we develop a methodological framework
comprising ﬁve indicators that can be used as a benchmark
for generic policy evaluation in non-tendering settings and
once originators lose exclusivity. Second, we  propose a
number of metrics that help assess the performance of each
of the proposed indicators over time, for example, one and
two years post-patent expiry. Third, we use market data
from a large number of patent-expired molecules to test
and measure the performance of the above indicators and
metrics in 12 EU Member States. Trends across each indi-
cator and metric are benchmarked against generic policies
in the study countries in order to highlight the effect of
supply and demand-side policies on generic drug entry,
competition, price evolution and volume share.
2. A methodological framework for generic drug
policy assessment
2.1. Empirical observations
Evidence suggests that across OECD countries over
65% of the pharmaceutical market comprises off-patent
medicines [8]. Health insurers implement combinations of
supply-, proxy demand- and demand-side policies aim-
ing to increase the diffusion and use of generics as well
as maximise their price effect. Through competition after
the expiry of intellectual property for the originator (patent
expiry, expiry of data exclusivity period), generic drug
entry and diffusion are expected to inﬂuence both the price
and volume share of branded products [10,11].18 (2014) 229–241
However, the literature on the inﬂuence of generic com-
petition on originator brand name prices and market share
is somewhat divided. While some studies [5,12] have found
that the price response to generic entry is as expected, in
that originator prices decline following generic entry, oth-
ers have found that prices of originator brands may  rise
upon generic entry [6,7,13]. In addition, while increased
competition between generic producers has been found
to decrease prices of generic drugs, the price of branded
drugs is not necessarily reduced by increased generic com-
petition [14]. It has also been shown that originator brand
manufacturers do not respond to generic market entry
by decreasing prices, but rather generic entry may  corre-
spond to a decrease in the speed of originator price increase
[15,16]. Evidence also suggests that manufacturers will
often not compete on price once generic competitors enter
the market [6,17].
Similar concerns exist about the price levels achieved
and the rate of price decline following generic entry. The
literature points to signiﬁcant price declines after generic
entry [15–17]; yet it has been argued that different forms
of regulation may  have an effect on the amplitude of such
a price decline and the generic market share [4,16,18].
The interface between competition and regulation seems
to lead to different pricing outcomes across countries; for
example, whereas price variation for originator brands in
ambulatory markets was found to be two- to three-fold
between highest- and lowest-priced country, price vari-
ation for generics was  found to be ﬁve- to twenty-fold
between highest- and lowest-priced country [9].
The effect of generic competition on volume or market
share of branded drugs following originator patent expiry
is less controversial than that of price response. Indeed, the
generic volume share grew from 30% after one year to 45%
two  years after patent expiry [4]. Overall, the originator
volume share decreases post-patent expiry, while generic
volume share increases.
The ambiguity identiﬁed in the results obtained above,
particularly with regards to pricing developments post-
patent expiry, remains because of the numerous external
factors that inﬂuence the effect of generic entry and compe-
tition on a country’s pharmaceutical market. Both supply of
and demand for pharmaceuticals in general, and generics
more speciﬁcally, are determined by factors such as con-
sumer needs, insurance structures, prescribing policies and
incentives, and pricing and reimbursement schemes [18].
2.2. Indicators and metrics to assess generic drug policy
The indicators proposed in this section underscore
generic entry, intensity of entry, price developments and
diffusion of generics over time. They are related to the pen-
etration of a product market by generics, following patent
expiry, the speed of that penetration, the price diminution
over time, the size of generic volume market share and the
speed of its evolution. In sum, the proposed indicators are:
(a) generic drug availability post-patent expiry; (b) time
delay to generic entry; (c) number of generic competitors;
(d) price development of originators and generics after loss
of exclusivity; and (e) evolution of generic volume market
share.
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Generic drug availability outlines the extent to which
eneric alternatives are available in a patent-expired
olecule. It is measured by the entry of generics and the
ime at which this occurs. This indicator helps determine
he proportion of patent-expired molecules that have avail-
ble generics and at what point after loss of exclusivity this
ccurs.
In terms of metrics to assess performance, generic drug
vailability can be assessed through (a) the share of total
olecules studied in each country with generic entry
ithin the ﬁrst 12 and 24 months following patent expiry,
b) the proportion of total sales facing generic entry within
he same timeframe and (c) the proportion of sales facing
eneric entry in the top and bottom decile of each market by
ales, 12 and 24 months post-patent expiry. The 12 and 24
onth benchmarks have been used widely in the literature
o measure entry, penetration, competition and availability
4,16] and are considered to be appropriate in the sense that
f generic entry does not occur up to 24 months after loss
f exclusivity, the beneﬁts from genericisation are likely to
e modest.
Delayed availability, occurring signiﬁcantly after patent
xpiry would suggest that the potential pecuniary savings
o health insurers from genericisation and price competi-
ion would occur with signiﬁcant delay. Non-availability of
eneric medicines would imply that patent-expired orig-
nator drugs retain their level of monopoly and that the
eneﬁts of price competition post-patent expiry do not
xist. By selecting the top and bottom decile by sales, we
re also able to study the extent of availability at the top
nd bottom segment of each product and country mar-
et. The top decile of sales accounts for a small number
f molecules, whereas the bottom decile of sales has a sig-
iﬁcantly greater variance in terms of molecules included.
Time delay to generic entry is deﬁned as the num-
er of molecules, as a proportion of total molecules that
ave generic entry following patent expiry, the propor-
ion of sales that are switched to generics, and the speed
t which generic entry is occurring. The proportion of
olecules and of total sales with generic entry can be
tudied quarterly at appropriate benchmarks (e.g. 3, 6,
2 and 24 months post-patent expiry). A further dif-
erentiation can be made based on delays studied for
he top and bottom decile of sales in order to gauge
ifferences across molecules with high and low sales,
espectively. The rationale for including this indicator and
he associated metrics in the analysis relates to the impor-
ance of generic entry occurring immediately after patent
xpiry, if health insurers are to capitalise on genericisa-
ion. Delays in generic entry are likely to prove costly
o insurers and beneﬁcial to patent-expired originator
rands.
The number of generic competitors measures the inten-
ity of entry in a molecule market post-patent expiry and
ts evolution over time. Economic theory conﬁrms that
he number of competitors per molecule may  be associ-
ted with downwards impact on prices and, potentially,
reater market penetration by generics [8,12]. The number
f generic competitors can be recorded for each molecule at
2 and 24 months after loss of exclusivity and a further dif-
erentiation can be made for the top and the bottom decile18 (2014) 229–241 231
by sales over the same timeframe. Trends are observed
by calculating the average number of generic entries per
molecule according to the market size of molecules by
sales. By calculating the average number of generic entries
for molecules in the top and bottom decile of each market
by total sales, it is possible to identify further trends in the
number of generic entries.
The price development indicator measures the response
of prices to the impact of generic entry post-patent expiry.
The extent of price decline post-patent expiry is depend-
ent on a number of parameters including the number of
entrants on the market, the size of the market and the type
of regulatory interventions in place [8]. Patent expiry infor-
mation can be combined with pricing data to identify the
price of the originator brand 12 months prior to patent
expiry and the price of the same brand and all available
generics 12 and 24 months post-patent expiry. Additional
metrics can include pricing dynamics for the top and bot-
tom decile by sales 12 and 24 months post-patent expiry.
The inclusion of generic volume market share is based
on the ratio of generic volume sold over total (brand and
generic) molecule volume sold in the ambulatory prescrip-
tion pharmaceutical market and its evolution over time,
calculated quarterly at molecule level. Average generic vol-
ume share for all molecules studied allows for comparison
between study countries. This indicator helps determine
the amplitude and speed of generic penetration as mea-
sured by market share of generics at molecule level.
Combined with reduction in prices, a high degree of generic
penetration would maximise beneﬁts to health insurers.
The metrics developed for this purpose are generic vol-
ume market share 12 and 24 months post-patent expiry
in the total number of off-patent molecules as well as the
top and bottom decile by sales. The framework comprising
both indicators and the metrics proposed for this purpose
are shown on Fig. 1.
3. Methods
3.1. Data sources
In order to test empirically the indicators and metrics
developed in the previous section, we used proprietary
data from Intercontinental Medical Statistics (IMS) [19].
The data covered the period from the last quarter of 1998
(Q4, 1998) to the last quarter of 2010 (Q4, 2010). The avail-
able variables included the date of patent expiry (available
monthly), prices, volume and sales data (all three avail-
able quarterly) for a total of 101 molecules (originator
brands and generics) and their combinations, which lost
patent protection between January 2000 to December 2008
individually across 12 EU MS  (Austria, Denmark, Finland,
France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal,
Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom), and the number
of generic competitors for each molecule. The analy-competition in the study countries, and to identify and
examine any associated changes in prices, sales and mar-
ket shares over time, following the expiry of the originator
patent.
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 for perfFig. 1. Methodological framework comprising indicators and metrics
3.2. Data organisation
Although the maximum number of molecules consid-
ered in this analysis that lost patent protection during the
study period was 101, not all molecules were available or
had patent expiries across the 12 study countries and the
number of patent-expired molecules available for study
ranged from 53 (the Netherlands) to 101 (France). In order
to enable pricing dynamics to be studied pre- and post-
patent expiry, the molecules included in the analysis had
their patent expired between Q1 2000 and Q4 2008, allow-
ing a minimum of 4 and 8 quarters, respectively, of price
and volume evolution data to be studied on either side of
patent expiry (before and after).
The 12 study countries were divided into three tiers
based on the perceived strength of their generic policies
(Table 1) [8,20,21]. Tier I (UK, Denmark, the Netherlands,
and Germany), had high levels of generic prescribing and
substitution in addition to allowing competitive pricing of
(generic) pharmaceutical products. Tier II (Austria, Finland,
France, Spain, Sweden), had moderate levels of generic
prescribing and employed intense generic price reduc-
tion strategies, including stepwise price reduction in some
cases. Tier III (Greece, Portugal, Italy), implemented price
capping on generics and had fewer incentives for generic
prescribing and substitution during the study period. While
these categorisations are in some way arbitrary and subject
to exceptions, they were thought to be useful in high-
lighting key similarities and differences in generic policies
among the study countries.
Pricing data were available at ex-factory level. Original
prices were available at retail level and prices were based
on Intercontinental Medical Statistics (IMS) Midas standard
historical prices for each originator brand. Standard
historical prices are calculated by converting different
formulations and dosages of a drug to a standard solid
dosage of one tablet (standard unit), providing a compara-
ble price measure independent of dose and pack size acrossormance measurement in off-patent markets. Source: The Author.
countries [19]. We  used local currency sales converted to
US dollars at constant exchange rates to convert price and
sales data to US dollars and thus also avoid the effect of
exchange rate ﬂuctuations. In order to arrive at ex-factory
level prices, average wholesale and retail mark-ups and
VAT rates applicable during the study period were taken
into account and were sourced from EU-wide surveys and
national sources [9].
Volume data were available in standard units (SU),
which were calculated by dividing the number of tablets
sold by the smallest common dose of a particular product
[22]. To compare drug prices across the study countries,
we used volume data for each study country to con-
struct weighted price indices, whereby the price of each
drug in the sample was  weighted according to its relative
frequency of use (volume). Unweighted averages would
probably result in an inaccurate measure of the relative
costs of drugs across countries because they do not take
into account the market shares and consumption of each
product [2,18,23]. As a result, we opted for country-speciﬁc
volume market shares (Paasche index) in order to produce
price indices. The Paasche index is calculated as follows:
PS =
n∑
j=1
Pjtqjt
n∑
j=1
Pj0qjt
100
where PS is the price index weighted by country-speciﬁc
volume market shares (own-country weights); pjt is the
price of product j at time t; pj0 is the price of product j
at the base period; qjt is the quantity of product j at time t;
n is the number of products.
When comparing prices and indices across countries,
one important conceptual advantage of the Paasche index
is that the use of each country’s volume weights enables
P. Kanavos / Health Policy 118 (2014) 229–241 233
Table  1
Summary of key supply- and demand-side policies related to generic drugs in 12 EU Member States, 2010a.
Tier Country Supply-side policies Demand-side policies
Generic price
cappingb
Internal price
reference (IPR)
Reimbursement
linked to
originator
Mandatory
generic
substitutionc
Generic (INN)
prescribingd
Generic
promotione
Tier I United Kingdom
√f √ √ √
Denmark
√  √g √ √
Netherlands
√  √ √ √
Germany
√ √g √
Finland
√  √ √ √g,h √ √
Tier  II Austria
√ √ √i
France
√ √ √ √g √ √
Spain
√ √ √ √
Sweden
√ √ √g √
Tier  III Italy
√ √ √ √ √ √
Greece
√ √ √ √
Portugal
√  √ √ √ √
Source: Based on [8,20,34].
a As the study period ranges from 2000 to 2010, this table reﬂects policy measures implemented in the study countries during that period and summarises
policy interventions as of 2010.
b Generics are subject to an ofﬁcial maximum price which cannot be more than a certain proportion of the branded originator price.
c For the majority of Member States, patients may  refuse substitution but will have to pay the price difference.
d It is mandatory in Portugal and strongly encouraged and practiced in the UK, but indicative (and widely monitored) in all other cases.
e Generic promotion refers to a number of interventions seeking to elicit response by prescribers, pharmacists and patients and increase the rate of
generic drug uptake. For physicians, both ﬁnancial incentives (e.g. budgets) and non-ﬁnancial incentives are indicated; for example, beyond mandatory
INN  prescribing, policies such as “generic prescribing unless brand is medically necessary”, prior authorisation for originator brands, reference pricing,
prescribing guidance are key in promoting use of generics. For pharmacists, the use of the payment method (either ﬁxed fee per prescription or regressive
markup) to incentivize generic dispensing beyond generic substitution, is key. And for patients, cost-sharing policies, including differential co-payments
(higher cost-sharing for originators and lower for generic equivalents, are essential in incentivizing generic use. Additionally, information campaigns
undertaken by government or health insurance promoting the value of generics in the general population, are considered to be helpful.
f In the UK, this is applied to only a very limited number of generics, as outlined in the Maximum Price Scheme (MPS) of 1999.
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sg Generic substitution is “mandatory” in Germany, Denmark, Finland a
h Finland: Until 2006, pharmacists were provided with discounts in ord
i Austria: as of 2007, generic promotion was in beginning to be develo
ifferences in consumption patterns across countries to be
aken into account. This is relevant and important in the
resent study, also because of the different product sam-
le sizes in each country. This is in contrast to the Laspeyres
ndex, which can also be used for cross-country compar-
sons but requires one reference country’s volume weights
o be used across all countries or the Fisher index, which
ould require that both Paasche and Laspeyres indices be
onstructed.
Patent expiry data were available for the month during
hich expiry occurred in each country. Finally, it was  possi-
le to identify and record all producers of generic products
y the extent to which sales by them were registered in
ndividual countries and, in this way, were able to report
ime to generic entry after loss of exclusivity.
The data were organised to study the performance of
he ﬁve distinct indicators and their associated metrics
s outlined in the previous section and shown on Fig. 1.
y cross-referencing patent-expiry dates, pricing data,
ales data and market of generic entrants, averages for
ach molecule were produced for each study country
nd over time across these indicators. Across all study
ountries, the top decile of sales is attributed to no more
han 5 molecules in the majority of cases, demonstrat-
ng the dominance of certain high selling (by volume) or
xpensive products (high price). There is far greater vari-
tion in the bottom decile, in which there is typically
 range of 40–60 molecules depending on the country
tudied.en.
oose speciﬁc generic products in substitution.
3.3. Study limitations
The analysis is not without limitations. A ﬁrst lim-
itation relates to the data sources, in particular patent
expiries and pricing data; the former may  be subject to
some bias due to the collection method, whereas the lat-
ter are calculated based on average margins, rather than
actual margins, implying that there may  be an upward or
downward bias in some of the prices reported. Researchers
and competent authorities undertaking this type of anal-
ysis ought to check the accuracy of their patent or data
exclusivity expiry data and price data collection. The sec-
ond limitation is that we cannot study price dynamics in
the case of tenders for outpatient generic medicines in
some countries, whereas we can in others. In particular,
although tenders for outpatient pharmaceuticals have been
used routinely in the Netherlands and Germany since mid-
2008 (the Netherlands) and 2007 (Germany), we  cannot
capture their effect and although their implementation
coincides with the end of the study period, their effect is
unknown. However, we can capture Danish and Swedish
tender prices, as these are publicly available. The third
limitation relates to the method used to provide volume
weights. In this study, we  have used the Paasche index (own
country weights) to weigh prices, but there are also two
other indices (Laspeyres and Fisher) that can be used in this
context. While we  believe that the Paasche index is most
appropriate for the type of analysis pursued in this study,
we would encourage competent authorities to also use the
 Policy 118 (2014) 229–241
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Laspeyres and Fisher indices in order to obtain a more com-
plete picture of the impact of volume weights on prices. The
fourth limitation is that we are not in a position to study
prescribing switches [24,25], a practice whereby when the
patent of a molecule expires, prescribers are likely to move
to a different molecule within the same therapeutic class,
or to a different therapeutic class. While this phenomenon
cannot be studied directly, the proximity of generic entry
to patent expiry and the amplitude of generic penetration
share potentially limit the likely effect this phenomenon
might have. Finally, we  are not able to quantify the likely
effect of market strategies that may  be employed by origi-
nator manufacturers aiming to inhibit early generic entry,
such as the creation of “patent clusters”, the phenomenon
of ever greening or prolonging patent litigation.
4. Results
4.1. Generic availability
In terms of overall generic availability, there are sub-
stantial differences across countries. Tier I countries have a
signiﬁcantly higher rate of generic availability (46.7% of all
patent-expired molecules in the UK and 47.1% in Germany)
than Tier III countries (32%in Italy and 24.6% in Greece)
(Table 2). These differences are also directly correlated with
the share of total sales that have launched a generic alterna-
tive. Depending on the country, 11–59% of total molecules
sales are not facing generic competition 24 months post-
patent expiry, but the proportion of molecules without
generic sales was higher in tier III countries (Greece 59%,
Portugal 30%) than it was in tier I (10% in Denmark, 11% in
the UK, 15% in Germany).
The top-10 molecules by sales had generic entry 24
months post-patent expiry in Germany, Denmark, the
Netherlands or Finland (Tier I countries), compared with
only 5, 7 and 8 top-10 selling molecules in Greece, Portugal
and Italy (Tier III countries), respectively. In the bottom 10%
of the market the proportion of molecules facing generic
entry was signiﬁcantly higher in tier I and II countries (73%
in the UK, 68% in Sweden and the Netherlands, 64% in
Denmark) than it was in any tier II country (63% in Italy,
50% in Portugal and 45.6% in Greece). The size of the mar-
ket in population terms does not seem to be, ceteris paribus,
a predictor for low generic penetration at either the top or
the bottom end of the market, as Denmark, Sweden, Austria
and Finland, all having small to medium-sized markets, had
among the highest generic penetration rates.
4.2. Time delay to generic entry
The time to generic entry following loss of exclusiv-
ity was found to vary considerably both between study
countries and between molecules. Over 75% of generic
sales were attributed to molecules that had generic entry
in the UK 3 months after loss of exclusivity, followed
by Finland (71.6%), Germany (71%), France (65.1%) and
Denmark (60.4%). This is testament to the speed of generi-
cisation in the UK, Germany, Finland and Denmark. At the
other end of the spectrum, Greece only had 12.4% of sales Ta
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Table  3
Time delay to generic entry (proportion of total sales).
Member State 0–3 Months Between 3 and
6 months
Between 6 and
12 months
Between 12
and 24 months
At 24 months No generic
sales after 24
months (%)
Proportion of patent-expired sales with generic entry (%)
Tier I UK 75.6 0.9 6.0 2.7 2.0 11.4
Denmark 60.4 15.1 4.7 6.1 2.8 9.6
Germany 71.0 8.8 1.9 1.7 3.2 14.7
The Netherlands 36.9 0.5 18.0 23.8 2.0 35.7
Finland 71.6 4.2 1.2 4.5 6.4 18.8
Tier  II Austria 34.4 15.4 6.0 6.0 4.4 28.3
France 65.1 0.9 1.6 4.4 7.4 32.2
Spain 51.8 6.9 4.4 12.1 10.9 23.7
Sweden 31.8 13.4 15.2 10.3 9.3 27.8
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eTier  III Italy 54.2 14.0 
Greece 12.4 11.1 
Portugal 38.8 6.9
ource: The author based on IMS  data.
enerically available within 3 months after loss of exclu-
ivity (Table 3).
Across the study countries, except Greece, over 55% of
otal sales faced generic competition within the ﬁrst 12
onths following loss of exclusivity. The rate of generic
enetration 12 months after loss of exclusivity was  highest
n the UK (83%), Germany (82%), Denmark (80%), Italy (78%)
nd lowest in Greece (33%), Portugal (55%), and Austria
nd the Netherlands (56%, respectively). The share of sales
hat did not have generic entry 24 months after loss of
xclusivity was lowest in Denmark (9.6%), the UK (11.4%),
nd Germany (14.7%) and highest in Greece (58.8%), France
32.2%) and Portugal (29.9%).
.3. Number of generic competitors
Both country and individual molecule market size seem
o inﬂuence the amplitude and depth of generic entry
cross the study countries. Overall, the number of generic
ompetitors increases post-patent expiry and in some cases
t does so very signiﬁcantly (Table 4). Country market
ize in terms of overall sales value does matter and there
s a striking difference in the number of generic com-
etitors entering the market for molecules facing a large
ountry market compared to molecules facing a smaller
ountry market. For example, in Germany the number of
eneric competitors 12 months post-patent expiry ranges
rom an average of 19 for the top selling molecules to
 for the lowest end of the market, compared with 4.5
nd 0.9 on average, respectively, in Austria. The variation
etween top and bottom decile of the market is also signif-
cant between Tier I and Tier III countries. For example, in
enmark, there are 5.6 competitors on average for the top
elling molecules and 0.8 competitors on average for the
ottom selling, compared with 0.9 and 0.4 generic com-
etitors, respectively, in Austria (12 months post-patent
xpiry).
.4. Price developmentsPrice developments are summarised on Table 5. Three
ypes of trends are reviewed for the period after loss of
xclusivity: ﬁrst, the price decline for all molecules that.0 3.9 2.0 25.7
3 7.5 24.7 58.8
7 13.6 20.4 29.9
had generic entry and the speed of price decline; second,
the price decline in the top and bottom decile by sales and
the speed of that decline; and third, pricing developments
in originator brands.
Across all molecules that had generic entry, prices seem
to decline, but signiﬁcant variability exists with regards to
the amplitude of decline and its speed across settings. The
price decline ranges from 16% (Italy) to 59% (Sweden) 12
months post-patent expiry, increasing to 21% (Italy) and
70% (Sweden) 24 months. Tier I countries have a higher
and faster decline than tier II (except Sweden) and tier
III countries. Signiﬁcant differences exist across all study
countries with regards to price developments after loss of
exclusivity in the highest and lowest decile of the market
by sales. Irrespective of country market size, prices are sub-
stantially lower in the highest decile; the speed of decline
is also considerably higher in tier I than in tier III countries.
In Denmark, for example, the price index declines to 19%
12 months after patent expiry (=100), compared with Italy
(price index 85.5%) or Greece (82.2%) for the same period.
Prices of molecules in the lowest decile by sales decline less
fast across the board and similar differences between tier I
and tier III countries can be observed as before.
In order to study the effect of loss of exclusivity on orig-
inator brands, we separated the brands that had generic
entry from those that had no generic entry after 24 months.
The price index of originator drugs that had generic entry
remains much closer to the price pre-patent expiry than
that of the generics in all study countries (Table 5). How-
ever, in the majority of cases and at 12 months post-patent
expiry the originator price is lower than the price pre-
patent expiry and declines further 24 months post-patent
expiry. In Denmark and Germany, prices of originators
seem to increase 12 and 24 months post-patent expiry as
generic entry increases, conﬁrming the generics paradox,
while in Greece, the prices of originators do not react to
generic entry and are slightly higher post-patent expiry,
probably indicating some exit across dosage forms. By con-
tract, the price index of originators that did not have generic
entry after loss of exclusivity, was  signiﬁcantly higher than
in the previous case; additionally, originator prices seemed
to increase in many cases between 12 and 24 months after
loss of exclusivity, rather than decrease.
236 P. Kanavos / Health Policy 118 (2014) 229–241
Table 4
Generic entry measured by the average and total number of observed entrants for the total number of study molecules and the top and bottom 10% of the
market.
Average number of generic
competitors across all molecules that
had generic entry (maximum observed
number of generic competitors)
Average number of generic
competitors at top-10 selling
molecules that had generic entry
(maximum observed number of
generic competitors)
Average number of generic
competitors at bottom 10% of market
of  molecules that had generic entry
(maximum observed number of
generic competitors)
12 months
post-patent
expiry
24 months
post-patent
expiry
12 months
post-patent
expiry
24 months
post-patent
expiry
12 months
post-patent
expiry
24 months
post-patent
expiry
All patent expired molecules Top 10 selling molecules Bottom 10% of molecules
UK 2.0 (6) 2.4 (7) 3.9 (6) 4.4 (7) 1.4 (5) 1.6 (5)
Denmark 3.5 (11) 3.8 (12) 5.6 (10) 5.7 (9) 0.8 (3) 1.5 (3)
Germany 10.8 (32) 13.6 (40) 18.9 (32) 22.3 (40) 3.9 (17) 5.3 (16)
The  Netherlands 1.9 (14) 4.7 (20) 6.0 (13) 7.6 (10) 3.4 (9) 4.1 (10)
Finland 3.4 (12) 4.8 (10) 4.3 (12) 6.4 (10) 2.2 (4) 2.8 (5)
Austria 2.8 (9) 3.9 (12) 4.5 (9) 6.4 (12) 0.9 (3) 1.2 (3)
France 4.8 (14) 6.5 (19) 7.7 (14) 10.2 (18) 1.4 (10) 2.3 (14)
Spain  4.9 (19) 6.7 (23) 7.7 (19) 10.2 (23) 2.7 (9) 3.3 (11)
Sweden 2.5 (8) 3.2 (11) 3.1 (7) 4.7 (10) 0.9 (4) 1.4 (4)
Italy  3.1 (24) 5.8 (38) 9.5 (24) 16.5 (38) 1.1 (4) 1.7 (8)
.9 (3) 
.9 (2) 
Greece 1.0 (9) 2.6 (21) 0
Portugal 2.0 (14) 4.7(20) 0
Source: The author based on IMS  data.
4.5. Generic volume share
The degree of generic penetration measured by the
share of generic volume in total volume sold differs
between study countries in terms of both absolute sizes
at a particular point in time and over time (Table 6). Across
all study countries, generic penetration increases post-
patent expiry. This increase is highest in the Netherlands
(62.1% overall generic penetration 24 months after loss of
exclusivity), Denmark (55.7%), Germany (54.9%) and the UK
Table 5
Volume-adjusted price indicesa measuring price developments 12 and 24 month
Price index at
patent expiry
Price index for generic drugs 
All molecules
with generic
entry except
originator
brand
All molecules
with generic
entry (except
originator) in
the top decile
by sales
12
Months
24
Months
12
Months
24
Month
UK 100 60.6 34.9 54.3 26.5 
Denmark 100 42.9 31.2 18.6 19.4 
Germany 100 61.8 56.1 48.4 43.4 
The  Netherlands 100 61.7 58.5 42.9 45.6 
Finland 100 50.5 36.9 30.3 22.7 
Austria 100 61.5 59.9 53.6 53.3 
France  100 69.5 66.3 56.8 53.8 
Spain  100 68.1 61.3 66.5 58 
Sweden 100 40.6 29.4 32.5 15.6 
Italy  100 84.2 79.0 85.5 78.0 
Greece  100 81.2 79.8 82.2 73.3 
Portugal 100 67.9 66.8 57.7 55.5 
Source: The author based on IMS  data.
a Own  country weights were used to construct price indices (Paasche index).
b The molecules that did not have generic entries 24 months post-patent expiry
(30),  Austria (58), Finland (41), France (67), Spain (57), Sweden (58), Italy (66), Gr4.4 (21) 0.8 (3) 1.6 (5)
0.6 (1) 0.4 (1) 0.9 (3)
(46.5%). These countries also display the highest speed at
which generics become available immediately after patent
expiry, measured by the market share of generics one quar-
ter after patent expiry (9% in the Netherlands, 15.5% in the
UK, 18% in Denmark and 21.5% in Germany). By contrast the
degree of generic penetration is lowest in Greece (9.1%),
Spain (15.3%) and Italy (21.5%) and the same occurs for
the speed at which these markets attract generics immedi-
ately after patent expiry (0.2%, 2.2% and 2.8%, respectively).
Importantly, the degree of generic penetration declines
s post-patent expiry for generics and patent-expired originator brands.
Price index for patent-expired
originator brands
All molecules
with generic
entry (except
originator) in
the bottom
decile by sales
Nominal price
developments
for ori-ginator
brands affected
by generic
entry
Nominal price
developments
for ori-ginator
brands not
affected by
generic entryb
s
12
Months
24
Months
12
Months
24
Months
12
Months
24
Months
76.7 56.5 99.1 96.8 107.8 103.4
43.3 34.8 105.9 102.6 117.5 118.5
93.8 85.6 105.1 106.2 103.8 103.4
77.1 69.4 91.5 85.6 98.2 98.4
59.8 45.1 88.5 75.8 94.0 100.3
66.4 64.8 83.9 76.1 111.3 109.8
85.2 80.4 98.1 94.5 111.7 114.4
68.8 62.1 101.7 98.6 100.9 101.6
55.2 52.2 93.4 93.9 112.1 101.5
93.0 89.0 86.8 84.8 99.6 100.4
94.1 87.2 103.2 103.4 103.5 104.8
82.7 72.4 97.3 95.7 102.9 105.3
 were as follows: UK (48), Denmark (36), Germany (46), the Netherlands
eece (43), Portugal (30).
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signiﬁcantly 12 months following the loss of exclusivity,
implying that the ﬁrst 12 months are critical for generic
market entry and penetration (Table 6).
Signiﬁcant variability can also be observed in the top
and bottom deciles by sales. Across all study countries, the
molecules included in the highest decile by sales generi-
cise much faster and display a signiﬁcantly higher degree
of generic penetration 12 and 24 months after loss of exclu-
sivity, than molecules in the bottom decile by sales.
5. Discussion and policy implications
In developing the methodological framework shown on
Fig. 1, our aim was to address key concerns of decision-
makers about the performance of their generic policies,
focusing on a number of pertinent questions. Key among
them were: whether a generic is available after loss of
patent exclusivity; how soon does a generic enter the
market; is there a sufﬁcient number of competitors to
stimulate price competition; do prices decline signiﬁcantly
post-patent expiry; does generic volume increase its share
relative to the originator brand; is the amplitude of price
reduction following generic entry related to the price level
at patent expiry; and is there a link between the magnitude
of price reduction post-patent expiry and generic market
share?
In addressing these questions we  have proposed a
methodological framework comprising ﬁve indicators and
several metrics per indicator, as a means of evaluating
whether generic policies are delivering the beneﬁts they
are purported to do or not. Our perspective in proposing
these reﬂect the priorities of decision-makers in different
settings: availability of generic medicines is a key concern,
particularly in small markets, where patent expiry is not
accompanied by generic entry due to small overall mar-
ket size [20]; the time to generic entry is of considerable
interest because if pecuniary beneﬁts are to accrue from
genericisation, the best time to do so is immediately after
loss of exclusivity. Generic entry occurring several months
or even a year after loss of exclusivity is more likely than not
to be less beneﬁcial as utilisation may  have been switched
to other therapeutic options that are patent protected.
Maximising generic market share and achieving low prices
are two  fundamental policy aims and ones that decision-
makers judge the success of generic policies by. Finally, the
extent to which there are sufﬁcient numbers of competi-
tors on the market is an indication of the robustness of
generic markets. Each of the proposed indicators is relevant
to decision-makers and all of them put together provide an
understanding and the framework of how different com-
ponents of generic market dynamics come together. While
the indicators have been selected based on objective crite-
ria reﬂecting key variables of interest, the selection of
metrics corresponds to potentially suitable endpoints for
decision-makers. Additionally, while the choice of top and
bottom deciles by sales and the selection of one, two or
four quarters post-patent expiry as appropriate endpoints
to judge performance may  appear arbitrary, they still rep-
resent valid endpoints, used already in earlier research
[4,6,16]. Despite the signiﬁcant advantages to considering
these indicators and their respective metrics together, an
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obvious limitation could be the intensity of information
required to monitor these.
The focus of empirical and policy-related research is a
testament of the relevance of the proposed methodologi-
cal framework: a great deal of the debate has focused on
price and market share developments post-patent expiry
[26,27]; in addition, availability, competition and time
delay to generic entry have featured strongly on the
research and policy agenda [4,8,16]. Independent analy-
sis has also highlighted the importance of demand-side
interventions in achieving greater savings for health care
[28,29], whereas economic theory and empirical evidence
predict that generic penetration will be greater in countries
with less strict regulatory policies because, ultimately, reg-
ulation reduces competition [10,11].
By relying on the proposed methodological framework,
the empirical ﬁndings in this study conﬁrm some of these
general predictions [4,16,30,31,37]. However, they also
question the expected effects of individual policies. In sum-
marising the ﬁndings by indicator, Fig. 2 highlights which
countries consistently demonstrate the highest and low-
est levels of price developments, generic penetration, time
delay to generic entry and competition relative to others.
Countries in Tier I (UK, Germany, Finland, Denmark, the
Netherlands) consistently show less time delay to generic
entry, higher numbers of generic competitors, faster price
decline and higher generic volume share, compared with
Tier III countries (particularly Greece and, to a lesser extent,
Italy and Portugal), which display almost the opposite
trends. Tier II countries are clustered in between the other
two tiers.
A pertinent question at this stage is the likely
impact that supply-side interventions (on prices) and
proxy demand-side interventions (on prescribing and
dispensing) have on each of the ﬁve indicators of perfor-
mance.
With regards to supply-side measures, some countries
with administrative controls on prices, such as price cap-
ping or linking the generic price to the originator (e.g.
Greece, Italy, France) show a signiﬁcantly slower price
reduction over time than countries that do not have these
controls (UK, Germany, Denmark, the Netherlands). The
latter also show the shortest delay in time to generic entry
and the highest rates of generic penetration. This seems to
be compatible with other evidence suggesting that price
reduction is greater in countries with competition than
regulation related to generics [37].
The evidence on price development and volume share
provide important insights into how generic entry is
related to achieving two speciﬁc policy goals, namely:
providing cost-effective drug options and decreasing drug
prices. With the exception of Austria, Sweden and the UK,
all other countries employed internal reference pricing
(IRP) systems during the study period.
Reference pricing systems are expected to increase
overall competition by making demand more “elastic” [32].
While reference pricing may  not directly affect faster and
more expansive generic entry, it follows that increased
competition will, eventually, corresponds to decreased
delays to generic entry and increased number of generic
competitors entering the market post-patent expiry. The18 (2014) 229–241
ﬁndings on delays to generic entry and number of generic
competitors question the extent to which reference pricing
allows for faster and more pervasive generic competition
post-patent expiry. For example, two study countries with
no IRP (UK, Sweden) seem to have experienced consid-
erably fewer delays to generic entry than countries with
IRP.
Reference pricing systems should result in signiﬁcant
cost-savings by inﬂuencing both the price and volume
share of the molecules they encompass. First, reference
prices should reduce the average price per molecule
through incentives for originator companies to reduce
prices in order to maintain market share post-patent expiry
[33]. Second, the generic volume share should correspond
to the response of the originator company’s price reduction
(i.e. the generic volume share would not be expected to rise
if the originator company lowers their price accordingly).
Finally, whether reference pricing systems will affect total
expenditures depends on whether they inﬂuence the price
or volume sales of either generic or originator drugs, and
whether they inﬂuence the mix  of expenditures on off-
patent drugs. Reference-pricing schemes will not, however,
increase overall generic use if the originator price decreases
to the level of the reference price [34].
The UK, an example of a liberal and open-market
pricing system in the off-patent segment, exhibits a well-
developed generic market according to the indicators
measured, particularly in terms of evoking post-patent
price competition quickly. In addition, the decrease in
price of both generic and originator products is relatively
high 12 and 24 months following patent expiry. While
the UK does not use reference pricing, several policies
have been employed to target generic prescribing includ-
ing teaching medical students the cost-saving beneﬁts
of generic products and implementing INN prescribing
on a mandatory basis. In contrast to the UK, Germany
was  one of the ﬁrst countries to implement an internal
reference pricing scheme but has developed a similarly
competitive generic market. Although the speciﬁcations
of the IRP scheme have evolved over time, price devel-
opments observed in Germany for molecules with patent
expiries during the study period suggest a relationship
between reference pricing and a pattern of high prices
for originator drugs and continually decreasing generic
prices following patent-expiry. Furthermore, the generic
volume share 24 months following originator patent expiry
is largest in Germany, which corresponds to recent pol-
icy analysis showing that changes in generic substitution
and increased budgetary pressure are changing prescrip-
tion behaviour and increasing the use of generics in
Germany [35]. The results show similar trends in other
MS with internal reference pricing systems but not as dis-
tinctly successful as in Germany. Greece is once again an
outlier; whereas a version of internal reference pricing
was  implemented with the speciﬁc intent of increasing
competition and encouraging generic sales [35], the ﬁnd-
ings suggest this has not been accomplished judging by
the insigniﬁcant generic volume share increases. Greece
provides an example of why  reference pricing schemes
must be reinforced with more pressure on the demand-
side, particularly INN prescribing or mandatory generic
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ubstitution, in order to increase generic entry, uptake and
ompetition.
A further question that we are able to address is the
mpact genericisation has on the prices of patent-expired
riginators. In the vast majority of cases, prices of those
riginators that face generic entry decline in response
o generic entry, with the exception of Germany and
enmark, where they increase. This shows signs that the
enerics paradox is conﬁrmed for those two countries,
ompatible with other evidence [6,7]. In the case of Greece,
rices of off-patent originators show no reaction to patent
xpiry. Prices of patent-expired originators that do not
ace generic entry, by contrast, are in most cases sticky
ownwards and in several cases, they increase post-patent
xpiry. This seems to suggest that generic competition and
he availability of generics are important determinants of
rice reduction of off-patent originator brands and their
bsence can lead to price escalation in these products.Countries with strong demand-side policies, for
nstance mandatory or strongly encouraged INN prescrib-
ng (UK) and/or mandatory generic substitution (Germany,
enmark, Finland, Sweden) show the highest degree ofEU Member States. Source: The author from IMS.
generic penetration post-patent expiry and also seem to
have the lowest time delay to generic entry. Countries that
do not strongly encourage INN prescribing or do not have
mandatory generic substitution (e.g. Greece and to a lesser
degree, Italy and Austria) have very low levels of generic
penetration and signiﬁcant delays in generic entry.
The effect of aggressive INN prescribing or substitu-
tion policies on generic entry and penetration may  not be
as predicted. In principle, mandatory generic substitution
may  decrease competition despite increased demand for
generics, as the lowest priced option will capture the
majority of sales, eventually reducing the number of
generic competitors able to compete on price [36]. Using
the ﬁndings to compare two  contrasting approaches to reg-
ulating the demand-side of the market, suggests that little
difference is observed. In Sweden, where generic substitu-
tion is mandatory, and in Austria where it is not allowed,
the average number of generic entries is very similar (in
terms of molecule numbers and when taking an average of
generic competitors facing all molecules, molecules in the
top 20% of sales and molecules in bottom 50% of sales). In
addition, in both study countries the majority of molecules
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experience the greatest number of generic competitors
within the ﬁrst 12 months post-patent expiry.
The effectiveness of generic prescribing and substitu-
tion policies may  be related to speciﬁc components of the
policies such as whether physicians or patients may  over-
rule generic substitution, the incentives or disincentives for
pharmacists to dispense generic over branded products and
the price difference between originator brand and generic.
For example, the number of generic entries is greatest in
Germany, where generic substitution is considered manda-
tory, except that physicians may  overrule substitution. This
is in contrast to Greece, where generic substitution was
disallowed during the study period, whereas pharmacists
were paid on a percentage basis across all medicines and
there are fewer generic entries per molecule compared
to the majority of other study countries. Similar trends
arise in the examination of different forms of policies on
generic prescribing. In the UK, Denmark, France, Germany
and the Netherlands there are long-standing policies and
in some cases explicit incentives for generic prescribing,
resulting in high generic volumes and larger numbers of
generic competitors per molecule 12 and 24 months fol-
lowing originator patent expiry. In the majority of cases a
large generics market share is also associated with greater
price declines than a smaller generics market share, as also
shown elsewhere [38].
6. Conclusions
In this paper we have proposed a methodological frame-
work comprising ﬁve indicators and several metrics that
enable the assessment of performance of generic drug
policies across different settings. This framework is inde-
pendent of the policy mix  for generic drugs pursued in
different settings, but helps evaluate the impact of such mix
on generic policy effectiveness. The subsequent empirical
analysis of generic entry and diffusion, price development
and generic market share conﬁrmed the diversity of out-
comes across regulatory settings, the differences that exist
at the high and low end of each market by sales, and the
likely impact of regulatory frameworks on generic entry,
competition and availability. Both the broad conclusions
and the speciﬁc ﬁndings of this study may  have impor-
tant public policy implications: ﬁrst, regardless of the size
of the pharmaceutical market or the policy mix pursued,
there is considerable potential for faster generic entry and
more generic competition, particularly at the lower ends
of the market. Second, the differences in generic entry and
competition and the experiences from different regulatory
measures suggest that there is considerable space for cross-
national policy learning. Finally, the need is highlighted
for further research into generic markets and the more
effective policy mix  that will maximise generic entry and
penetration and lead to greater expenditure optimisation
by health insurers.
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